Bangladesh - A Lengthening Shadow of Terror

Bangladeshi soil is increasingly being used for terrorist and for subversive activities by religious extremists, pan-Islamist terrorist groups, and insurgents operating in India’s Northeast, substantially through the active collusion of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI).

There were grave concerns about the possibility of Islamist extremists in the country acquiring radioactive materials and the technical know-how to build a ‘dirty bomb’, when on May 30, 2003, Bangladeshi police arrested four suspected members of a Islamist group, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, at a house in the northern village of Puiya. Officers also seized a football-size package with markings indicating it contained a crude form of uranium manufactured in Kazakhstan. Subsequent tests at the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission in Dhaka confirmed that the 225-gram ball was uranium oxide—enough to make a weapon capable of dispersing radiation across a wide area if strapped to conventional explosives.

Reportage during the first quarter of 2003 indicates the existence of Al Qaeda operatives in Bangladesh, coordinating their activities with local Islamist groups, validating perceptions that the country is emerging as a major safe haven for Islamist terrorist formations.

The broad trends during the year 2002 remained largely unchanged in the first quarter of 2003. Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), further tightened its hold over Bangladesh by harnessing past linkages with Islamist fundamentalists and certain sections of the military and political establishment. Internally, various Islamist groups remained active and enlarged their subversive agenda.

Since the elections of October 2001, and the installation of a new regime headed by Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and backed by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), communal tension and Islamist extremist mobilization has risen dramatically. The JeI, which has two Ministers in the new government, and 17 members in Parliament, allegedly receives support from the ISI, including funding and arms flows, as well as technical and training support.

A number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda, have established a presence in Bangladesh in alliance with various militant fundamentalist organizations there. Prominent among these is the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD), which was established with direct aid from Osama bin Laden in 1992. The HuJI-BD has very close links with the ISI, and received financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan (under the Taliban) through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh, including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin.

Various terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast continue to find safe haven and operating bases on Bangladesh territory. Groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have been emboldened by the new BNP Government in Bangladesh, which in its previous term was seen as supportive of insurgent formations acting against India. Many leaders of Bangladesh’s ruling party have direct business linkages, including partnerships in corporations and financial operations that are run by, or co-owned with, leaders of such terrorist organisations. During its previous regime between 1991 and 1996, the BNP provided these groups with liberal facilities, including training camps, bank accounts, facilitation for arms purchases, and freedom of operation from Bangladeshi soil. As a result these terrorist groups, on the run in India’s Northeast under persistent pressure from Army operations, found a much-needed breathing space to regroup and re-launch their offensive against India.

Although the Government has reacted fiercely to suggestions that Bangladesh has become a new theatre of the activities of Islamist fundamentalist groups, including the Al Qaeda, reports suggest otherwise:

Shortly after the fall of Kandahar in late 2001, several hundred Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters escaped by ship from Karachi in Pakistan to Chittagong. They were then trucked down – allegedly by the DGFI – to hidden camps in the Ukhia area, south of Cox's Bazaar.

Asian security services indicated that militants from the Jemaah Islamiah – which is connected to the Al Qaeda and seeks to set up a gigantic Islamic state encompassing Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and southern Philippines – were also hiding out in these camps, which were set up in the early 1990s to train rebels from the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar's Rakhine State. The Jemaah Islamiah militants in hiding in southeastern Bangladesh are believed to be mostly citizens of Malaysia and Singapore.

On May 10-11, 2002, representatives of nine Islamist fundamentalist groups, including the HuJI, reportedly met at a camp near Ukhia town and formed the Bangladesh Islamic Manch (Platform). A transnational organization, it includes a group representing the Rohingyas, a Muslim minority in Myanmar, and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, a small group operating in India’s northeast. By June 2002, Bangladeshi veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s were reportedly training members of the new alliance in at least two camps in southern Bangladesh.

Evidently, the new right-wing regime, which came to power after the general elections of October 2001, has created a more favourable atmosphere for the operation of various extremist forces in the country. While the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami – which is the major alliance partner of the ruling BNP – may not be directly responsible for subversive or terrorist activities, its inclusion in the coalition government has meant that other radical groups feel they now enjoy protection from the authorities and can act with impunity. The HuJI, for example, is reported to have 15,000 members of whom 2,000 are described as ‘hard core’.

Islamist extremists in Bangladesh have for long maintained operational linkages with a number of foreign Islamist groups. Investigations into the January 22, 2002, terrorist attack on the American Centre in Kolkata, capital of the Indian State of West Bengal, brought these linkages to the fore.

The Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), which claimed responsibility for the attack, is essentially a criminal group allied to the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD), which has very close links with the ISI.

The arrest of Aftab Ansari alias Farhan Malik, prime accused in the American Centre attack, led to further disclosures regarding the international linkages between the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the HuJI based in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Aftab Ansari played a key role in the July 25, 2001 abduction of Kolkata-based businessman Partha Pratim Roy Barman, who was subsequently released on July 30, 2001 after reportedly paying a ransom amount of Rupees 37.5 million in Dubai through the Hawala network.

It was out of this money that Omar Sheikh – convicted by a Pakistan court in the Daniel Pearl murder case – is said to have wired $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, the alleged ringleader of the hijackers in the 9/11 multiple terrorist attacks.

http://satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/2003/chapter10.htm

KPS Gill

Bangladesh spy agency DGFI spreading roots in East India

Binnaguri: After Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), its now Bangladesh's directorate general of forces intelligence (DGFI) that has become a concern for the security agencies.

According to Lt. Gen. K.S. Jamwal, general officer commanding-in-chief, Eastern Command, DGFI's activities in India are on the rise, with support from terror outfits in the North-East (Of India).

"Top leaders of Ulfa and other North-East terror groups are hiding in Bangladesh with DGFI's support. As payback, they are helping DGFI build a network here." Lt. Gen. Jamwal said.

He was speaking at an investiture ceremony in Binnaguri, where 32 army personnel were awarded Sena Medals, three of them posthumously.

DGFI is trying to turn its plan of establishing a sovereign Islamic state in the North-East into reality. The agency is receiving support from ISI. As part of its plan, there is a sustained effort to push in Assamese speaking Bangladeshis into the North-East. Outfits like Ulfa have been convinced to discriminate simply on the basis of language and not nationality.

According to reports from central intelligence agencies, the aim of ISI and DGFI is to create an independent Islamistan, comprising Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and the districts of Malda, Murshidabad, South Dinajpur, North Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar in West Bengal.

The Times of India, Kolkata
Saturday, January-19, 2008
Reporter: Pinak Priya Bhattacharya

The Shiliguri Corridor - Question Mark on Security

By: Pinaki Bhattacharya (SATP.ORG)

A critical futuristic threat perception vis-à-vis India’s North Eastern region has long preoccupied many analysts and the Indian security establishment. The projected exercise would involve Pakistan launching an attack on Jammu and Kashmir. At the other end, China would engage India militarily in the latter’s Northeast with movement from Tibet, through Bhutan and via Alipurduar in the Jalpaiguri district and consequently cut-off what is referred to as the eastern chicken’s neck or the Shiliguri corridor. An Indian strategists’ nightmare come true. A possibility that was touched upon in the recently published novel by a former BBC journalist, Humphrey Hawksley, called Dragon Fire. 

In such a projected war scenario, while India battles Pakistan and China, behind the lines of the security forces guarding the narrow strip of land called the Shiliguri corridor, which at its narrowest is 20 kilometres long and just 20 kilometres wide in the general area south west of Shiliguri, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the Bodos, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation and other subversives trained in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan raise attrition to a feverish pitch. China could, it is projected, choose to cut the chicken’s neck with irreversible consequences vis-à-vis India’s Northeast.

A reasonable assumption of this nature reportedly influenced a group of senior Indian security officials to meet in May 2000.¹ The meeting concluded that a constant vigil needed to be maintained at the Bagdogra airport in Jalpaiguri and railway stations like New Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar, as also at Kishanganj and Katihar in the State of Bihar. Such a constant vigil was directed towards monitoring the movement of those who are rather quaintly called ANEs (anti-national elements). The meeting also resolved that a joint operation of Assam and West Bengal police needs to be launched to flush out terrorists, besides beefing up the deployment of security forces. 

In case such hostilities actually broke out, one of the crucial Chinese objectives would be to capture a large amount of territory in northern Sikkim to secure a strategic hold. In tactical terms, this would translate into denying a launching pad to the Indian forces for an assault on Tibet. The other element of this thrust, it is projected, would be centred on capturing areas in Bhutan – the ones traditionally claimed by the Chinese – thus posing a direct threat to the Shiliguri Corridor, a key item on the agenda.2

The Shiliguri Corridor3 is an area of 12,203 square kilometers connecting mainland India with the outlying border States of the Northeast. An intelligence report of one of security forces operating in the area states: "As geographical configuration puts the North Eastern States of our country at a disadvantage for a lack of strategic depth, considered necessary to provide a buffer, the tenuous lines of communication (that run through this corridor) connect mainland India to the Northeast." The corridor’s dimensions extend lengthwise approximately 200 kms with a width varying between 20 and 60 kilometres. It houses the all-important feeder highways number NH 31 and 31a and the North Frontier Railways. 

During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, a division-strength of troops was moved in record time from Punjab to Shiliguri in order to protect north Bengal and Sikkim from the advancing Chinese. The Chinese were pressing ahead of the Tawang sub-division of what is now known as Arunachal Pradesh, which the Indian troops had vacated. The Chinese were also found to be amassing troops across Sikkim. As Pakistan had terminated river traffic through the then East Pakistan, all supplies for Assam had to be routed through railways from Katihar in Bihar to Baminigaon via the corridor, where the Brahmaputra river needed to be crossed by ferry.

The corridor is also significant in light of the vital installations located around it, like the airfields of Hashimara and Bagdogra, and the oil pipelines, which run through the corridor. These installations are considered to be lethal sabotage targets for insurgent groups lurking behind the lines of defence.

One of the key borders that abut the corridor is with Nepal, stretching 144 kilometres on the other side of north Bengal. Being unmanned, the long stretch of the border proves immensely conducive for infiltration and also as a point of egress for ANEs originating in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore, the Indo-Nepal Friendship treaty of 1950, which guarantees free and unhindered movement of Nepalese citizens between the two nations, has been handy for infiltration exercises. The absence of security forces on the Indo-Nepal border also attracts agents of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the external intelligence agency of Pakistan, and their co-conspirators to opt for various clandestine, or even occasionally, regular or open routes in the area. Of course, in legal terms, while the Nepalese and the Bhutanese can enter and exit at any point on the border, the other nationals are required to adopt only an authorised route, which also acts as the trade route between India and Nepal. In practice, however, there is little to prevent the ANEs from crossing over at any point, virtually of their choice.

It is only in recent times that the Indian security apparatus has become aware of the situation on the Indo-Nepal border. According to reports, the Group of Ministers that scrutinised the Madhav Godbole Committee Report on border management has recommended that the 1,751-km border be policed by the paramilitary force, the Special Service Bureau (SSB)4. According to news reports, the Godbole report critically analysed issues related to "border-fencing, safeguarding of air space, checking infiltration and smuggling activities, restructuring of para-military forces guarding the borders and adoption of modern technology as a force multiplier."5 The group, headed by the Union Home Minister, L K Advani, has also suggested that the SSB’s armed wing be brought under the command and control of the Union Home Ministry to counter smuggling and ISI activities originating in Nepal.6 

According to premier intelligence agencies, the Shiliguri corridor faces threat not only from this pattern of free movement of personnel and goods through the border areas, but also from insurgents operating from Bhutan and particularly in Assam. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) militants have been using the corridor for their movement for a long time. The recent emergence of another insurgent outfit, called the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO),7 in north Bengal, is adding to the worries of the security forces. Intelligence reports indicate that, in 1993, certain members of the Rajbongshi community belonging to the ranks of the All Kamtapur Students’ Union (AKSU) approached ULFA cadres in the Kokrajhar district of Assam and sought arms training from them. They were primarily directing their efforts towards organising an armed struggle for realising their demand of a separate Kamtapur State, carved out of the districts of north Bengal. Following their contact, 12 Rajbongshi youth were allowed to be trained in a training camp organised by the ULFA in Bhutan to the north of the trijunction of Bhutan-West Bengal-Assam. The training could not be completed due to a constant threat from the security forces and also because certain ULFA cadres had surrendered.

The Rajbongshi leadership, primarily the AKSU, however, continued their efforts. They contacted some members of the central leadership of ULFA, who in turn agreed to train them on the condition that they form a secessionist outfit. This led to the formation of the KLO. Members of the newly formed KLO were imparted arms training during 1996-97 in Samdrup Jhankar in Bhutan where the central headquarters of ULFA is situated.8 The KLO also established its headquarters near the ULFA HQ at Samdrup Jhankar. The ULFA’s agenda was to prop up the Rajbongshi militants for its own gains, and the West Bengal tribals were aiding the outfit to create safe havens in North Bengal.9 The trained KLO cadres, on their return from Bhutan mingled with the activists of the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP) and AKSU, and have been working with them. An estimated 100 KLO terrorists have received arms training at the Gelengphu and Kalaikhola camps in Bhutan, and reports also indicate that the ULFA and KLO had reached an agreement to launch a joint armed struggle.10 The movement for Kamtapur has thus turned violent with sporadic incidents of looting, extortion, killings and sabotage. Of late, the KLO and the ULFA have started an extortion drive targeting the local tea gardens.11 They are most active in Alipurduar in Jalpaiguri and Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling. 

Reports indicate that a large number of KLO cadres have received arms training at the ULFA camps in neighbouring Bhutan.12 There are also reports of growing terrorist and subversive activities by the KLO in league with ULFA militants. Pakistan-trained and ISI-backed ULFA insurgents are reported to have imparted arms training to three successive batches of KLO insurgents. Of the three KLO batches, one was trained in a forest in Jalpaiguri district, while the other two were trained in Bhutan.13 The arrest of a KLO activist from Matabhanga on May 29, 2001 exposed the linkages between KLO and ULFA and the training structures in the corridor.14 Earlier, three KLO insurgents arrested from Cooch Behar on December 8, 2000, confessed to having undergone advanced arms training in the ULFA camp in the Fifshu jungles of Bhutan.15 According to official sources, they were part of a 60-strong batch of KLO and ULFA cadre, who had received advanced arms training between April 15 and July 15, 2000, at ULFA’s Nichula area command camp.16 In certain instances, KLO militants have been reported to sneak into Assam after committing violent activities in West Bengal. The ULFA cadres are reportedly entering the plains of Bengal from the Kumargram village on the borders of Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh, to train KLO insurgents.17 ULFA cadres have been using north Bengal as a transit point to go from Bhutan to Bangladesh and vice versa, while some militants have also crossed over to Nepal through this area.18 The ULFA militants often visit north Bengal for medical attention and there are reports that ULFA cadres also use the area to transport arms and ammunition to their camps in Bhutan.19 

The forests on the border of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan with West Bengal also provide ample space for the insurgent groups to operate. The recent encounter20 between security forces and the Gorkha Liberation Organisation (GLO), a radical breakaway faction of the Subhash Ghising-led Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), cadres in the Tinkatari jungles provides ample testimony of the preparedness of the insurgents in the area, as also their growing co-ordination with various groups, particularly with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland –Issak Muivah (NSCN-IM). The attempted assassination21 of the Gorkha leader, Subhash Ghising, while he was returning to Darjeeling after a meeting with Union Home Minister Advani is an indicator of this collusion. The attack is widely believed to be the handiwork of Chhatre Subba, a one-time Ghising protege who has turned against the GNLF supremo for his purported betrayal of the Gorkhaland cause. One of the slain assailants was also identified as an NSCN-IM member. And the fact that the other team members were reported to have fled to Nepal is indicative of a broader conspiracy. The NSCN-IM is also allegedly training certain Gorkha and Nepali youths.22 Two NSCN-IM cadres were killed in an encounter in the Shamsingh forest in Darjeeling district on November 12, 2000.23 According to intelligence sources in Shiliguri, the NSCN-IM cadres were part of an instructors’ group that had travelled to West Bengal to impart arms and explosives handling training to the GLO. 

Reports also suggest that the ISI was supplying a large quantity of arms and ammunition to the various Northeast terrorist outfits from the stockpiles of the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia after their defeat and eventual obliteration.24 These were picked up from the markets of Thailand and were transported to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, eventually to be used on Indian soil. The arms were shipped from Thai ports to Cox’s Bazaar and were then carried on headloads for rest of the way.25 The recipients were the NSCN-IM, ULFA and the Bodo groups. 

The NSCN-IM has gradually become the primary militant outfit in the region, providing training and resources to various other groups. Recently, however, the Myanmarese authorities initiated a crackdown on the terrorist groups operating from their soil in the area. Media reports have indicated that an NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) camp was attacked by Myanmarese and Indian security forces in the Konyak region of Myanmar, adjacent to Nagaland.26 Earlier, in October 2000, a botched operation of the Myanmar Army caused the death of five Assam Rifles personnel during an encounter with the Khaplang group cadres.27 Evidently, this mounting pressure has made the NSCN-K amenable to a cease-fire, which the Indian government offered recently. 

Reports indicate that while there are no training camps of the ULFA and NSCN in Coochbehar and Alipurduar, there are indications that Bodo militants have their training camps in the adjoining areas at the tri-junction of these two districts with Bhutan, in the jungles of Kalikhola in that country. The security forces have arrested certain couriers transporting ration and also ascertained the frequent movement of Bodo militants along the banks of the Sankosh river near Kalikhola. Terrorist training camps in Bhutan also exist in the areas of Goberkundi, south of Udang river, Lungkhavgma, Merungphuc, Sukhini and Dinsing river. Even though these areas do not abut the Jalpaiguri district, arrested militants have confessed to having obtained training in these areas. An ULFA terrorist, Tarani Biasya, arrested in Alipurduar on February 9, 1998, had confessed to having been trained in Sukhini. These militants often transport small arms from Bangladesh to Bhutan through the Shiliguri Corridor on trucks that transport goods to and from Bangladesh, inducing the truck drivers and owners by threats and money. 

Shiliguri town is a gateway to Guwahati in Assam, Gangtok in Sikkim and Kishengunj in Bihar. It also shares borders with three countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The town’s cosmopolitan character, grown out of it being "an island of prosperity," makes it easier for outsiders to get assimilated into the local populace, thus providing perfect cover to the subversives. In fact, the West Bengal government had admitted on the floor of the State Legislative Assembly in 1999 that the Shiliguri corridor ran the risk of being sabotaged by ISI agents. This was admitted by the then Deputy Chief Minister and Minister in-charge for Home, while responding to the Opposition’s charges following a bomb blast at New Jalpaiguri Station of north Bengal on June 22, 1999. Some 10 persons, including two Indian Army personnel bound for Kargil, were killed and more than 80 persons injured in the incident.28 

Security agencies are also concerned at the mushrooming growth of mosques and madrassas (religious seminaries) in the region. According to their estimate, in the last five years the total number of madrassas that have come up in the Shiliguri Corridor area are as follows: Coochbehar – 45, Jalpaiguri – 44, Shiliguri – 63 and Islampur sub-division, North 5, Dinajpur – 467. Of these only 23 in Coochbehar are recognized by the West Bengal government; eight in Jalpaiguri; two in Shiliguri and seven in Islampur. Yet, the others are flourishing with no dearth of funds. Intelligence sources suspect that people having linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist outfits have set up at least some of these mosques and madrassas. 

Intelligence reports also state that the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) – renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM) – and active in Jammu and Kashmir, has spread its tentacles in the region, with Nepal and northern West Bengal as their preferred ground. It is reportedly spreading Muslim fundamentalism and establishing a string of bases in the Northeast, as also in northern West Bengal. The HuA is reported to have succeeded in raising a large number of supporters in the Dangipara area of Shiliguri town, as also in adjoining areas like Naxalbari, Fulbari, etc. 

According to intelligence sources, another organisation called Tabligh-e-Jamaat is also reported to be active around the Shiliguri Corridor. They hold regular meetings along Champasari and Bardhaman Road near Hawra camp in Shiliguri and are also in contact with the Harkat-ul-Ansar in Nepal. There are also indications of close linkages between the two groups, with senior members of each attending the meetings of the other. Although the activity of the organisation is discreet, it reportedly includes anti-India propaganda, ‘universalisation’ of Islam and raising funds for ‘Islamic causes.’ 

Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar districts, which constitute the Coochbehar sector of the corridor, are bounded by the Bhutan border in the north, starting from Phuntsholing to Kalikhola tri-junction, and are also contiguous with 410 kilometres of international border with Bangladesh. To the east from Kalikhola the boundary runs south along the western bank of the Sankosh River, parallel to Kokrajhar and Dhubri districts in Assam. From the Bangladesh border, there are three points where the Bhutan border is at a distance of approximately 60 kilometres. This area not only has NH 31 and NH 31A running through it, but also has broad-gauge and metre-gauge railway lines passing through before entering Assam. The demographic character of the area along the Bhutan border comprises Santhals, Bodos, Nepalis and Rajbongshis. In the Cooch Behar sector live the Bengali Hindus, Rajbongshis, Bengali and Bihari Muslims. Rajbongshis, Bengali Hindus and Muslims live in the areas along the Bangladesh border.

The demographic profile within a 5-kilometre belt of the international border with Bangladesh has undergone rapid changes. According to intelligence sources, in Jalpaiguri district, while the population of Hindus and Muslims has been 1,35,938 and 1,63,522 respectively in 1981, in 1991 it rose to 1,90,805 and 2,35,733 respectively. In Coochbehar, the figure in 1981 was 2,17,588 and 1,41,001 respectively; while in 1991 it was 2,94,038 and 1,85,528 respectively. In the Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling district, the numbers were 48,110 and 71,215, respectively, in 1981; while in 1991, they were 72,518 and 1,12.302, respectively. In the Islampur and Raigunj sub-divisions of north Dinajpur, they were 1,78,583 and 2,60,507, respectively, in 1981; rising to 2,51,472 and 3,41,325, respectively, in 1991. 

In early 1999, a media report had indicated that a significant demographic transformation was occurring around the Corridor, causing serious concern among security agencies. The report, quoting official sources, pointed out that, while in 1971 the Muslim population was 15 per cent, in recent years it has touched a high of 70 per cent in some areas, primarily due to illegal immigration from Bangladesh. The report referred to the phenomenon of a large number of Muslim immigrants residing in Islampur of North Dinajpur district as also Kishangunj of Bihar. The report had also claimed that untrammelled passage through these areas was available to the thousands of Bihari Muslims who claim Pakistan’s nationality but remain in Bangladesh because the former refuses to take them in.29

Given the criticality of threat perceptions, one needs to discern the reasons for such an apparent laxity in vigil. It is plausible to seek explanations in the tradition of thin policing of the borders in the area. Security force levels in the Cooch Behar sector30 consist of four units of the Border Security Force (BSF) deployed along the 410 km of the international border, from border post number 814 to 1001; on the Assam-Bhutan border, a three-company strength of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is deployed. The West Bengal Armed Police maintains a platoon and an Army unit is deployed in Cooch Behar, but is not assigned internal security duty. SSB companies are also deployed in Tufanganj, Natuarpur and Hindusthan, and in other areas in the sector. The configuration of intelligence agencies in the area has the Intelligence Bureau at the apex followed by the Field Intelligence Units (FIU) of the Army, SSB and the BSF. Efforts are currently being directed towards seeking a unified effort and greater co-ordination in operations of the security forces.

One of the key security concerns of the area is gunrunning. According to a media report, there were two routes through which this lucrative trade was being conducted. In the first, arms were first sent to certain safe havens in Shiliguri and later dispatched in small quantities by local couriers who would typically travel by road or rail. Consignments were then loaded on Dooars-bound buses heading towards Jaigaon on the Indo-Bhutan border. Gunrunners also utilise the metre-gauge railway line between Shiliguri and Alipurduar via Hashimara and Birpara. They are then transferred to hideouts in the Jayanti hills in the north or Alipurduar in the south.31 The other preferred route is through the riverine tri-junction in Kishangunj in the Coochbehar district of West Bengal. The loads are ferried by country boats at night and later transported in small numbers by local carriers to Islamabad in Madarihat and Falakata in the Jalpaiguri district. 

Another cause for concern for the security apparatus is the growing nexus between the militant groups and illegal timber traders. Along the Assam-West Bengal border, timber trading is a lucrative business due its high demand in West Bengal and in other parts of the country. Various sawmills in the area north of Bakshirhat in Cooch Behar are reported to be recipients of smuggled timber, including teak and sesame wood, from Assam. Sawmill owners enjoy the patronage of terrorist outfits based in Assam, who in turn extort large sums of money from them in return for security. In their operations, the militants also utilise various modes of transport like trucks, mini vans and motorcycles owned by the sawmill owners. Recent developments show that the Bodo militants, as also the ULFA, have shifted base to the forests of Bhutan, traversing from their earlier safe houses in Bangladesh. At the narrowest point in the region, the distance between the Bhutan border and the Bangladesh border is a mere 60 kilometres. And considering the fact that the Cooch Behar sector is relatively calm, it is policed lightly. Furthermore, there are no mobile checkposts in the region to challenge any movement of suspicious nature. 

Intelligence agencies fear that many key installations in the Shiliguri Corridor are liable to sabotage by militants. Such installations include the bridge on the national highway near Barovisha in Darjeeling district, the railway-bridge over river Raidhak, the bridge connecting the national highway and the railway-bridge over Sankosh River. 

Before 1947, the North Eastern States, especially Assam, were connected with the mainland through waterways, road and railway networks running through what was then a part of the Bengal Presidency and later named East Pakistan and, eventually, Bangladesh. Thus, linkages between that country and the Assamese were deep, and these, the ISI later sought to exploit. In fact, a Foreign Service officer of Bangladesh, Mohammad Siddique, has claimed that "India had received the corridor at Shiliguri, though Bangladesh (i.e. the then East Pakistan) had more claims over the territory because of population characteristics."32

Such a mindset has created worries in the security establishment, and these were articulated by the former Director of the Intelligence Bureau and former Governor of West Bengal, T V Rajeshwar: "It is not Kashmir alone which should cause anxiety. The Bangladeshi infiltration, which continues unabated, has changed the demographic pattern of eastern India. There is a grave danger to the Shiliguri Corridor, which is the lifeline of the seven North Eastern states and Sikkim, because of the concentration of the Bangladeshi migrants there. Bengal’s premier in 1946, Nizamuddin, wrote to Governor R.G. Casey that Bengal would soon become a Muslim majority province if left undisturbed. Even if his dream was belied because of the Partition, Dr. Henry Kissinger’s foreboding of a Muslim majority state emerging from within Indian borders is there to contend with."33

Thus, it is evident that the Shiliguri Corridor faces major threats in its geographical vicinity from the overbearing Chinese presence as also from relatively minor neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore, the overarching consideration in the security framework is the ability of Pakistan to subvert the regimes in these countries and consequently increase insurgent pressures in the area. 

Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the architect of Bangladesh and its first Premier, every regime in that country has fostered anti-Indian forces within its territorial ambit. Indeed, Begum Khaleda Zia, the current Premier, had gone to the extent of calling the Northeast insurgents, "freedom fighters."34 The crucial leverage that Bangladesh has gained in its endeavour to create instability in India at a low cost is the large number of its own people residing on Indian soil. The Bangladeshis have a novel way of ‘legalising’ their immigration in India. The relatives who are in India reportedly get the names of those across the border included in the voters’ list during enumeration. As their names finally appear in the list, messages are then sent across to them to finally cross over. It is this population that reportedly creates a buffer of non-combatants for the militants and they utilise them as perfect cover. 

Even though an Indian protectorate, the Royal Kingdom of Bhutan has, in the recent past, played host to ULFA and Bodo militants, who have found a comfortable habitat in the southern part of the country. In fact, some reports claim that captured ULFA cadres have vouched to witnessing three visits by the King of Bhutan to their camps. However, recent reports reveal that the Bhutanese government has commenced fortification of its borders with Assam, ostensibly to deter the free passage of militants. They have reportedly deployed 3,000 troops on the border and are planning to put more forces on the ground.35 But the King and the government indicate marked reluctance to engage the militants on the grounds that "We are not sure of the kind of support these militant groups enjoy in Assam and in case there is an armed conflict between the Bhutanese security forces and the militants, it would have a major impact on the country’s economy and its age-old relations between the people of Bhutan and Assam would be seriously affected. It may take many years before the relations normalised."36

Certain analysts perceive eastern Nepal, bordering the Shiliguri Corridor, to be the springboard for Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in the Northeast. Nepal’s proximity to this passage assumes significance because of its strategic importance. Bound by Nepal and Bangladesh in the south, the use of this passage for transferring small arms and contraband from both the countries is now well established.37

The fact that Nepal has been open to subversion by ISI operatives is also beyond dispute. Yakoob Memon, one of the accused in the 1993 Mumbai blast case, was traced in Nepal,38 and then the infamous IC-814 hijacking had its origins at the Tribhuvan International Airport, causing substantial damage to bilateral relations between India and Nepal, which took some effort in mending. But the fact that the Nepalese are not adopting a laid-back attitude about taking actions against those who are using their territory for launching anti-India campaigns is evident in the recent arrest and incarceration of a senior Pakistani diplomat, who was found in possession of large quantities of explosives.39 

In 1962, when the Chinese had begun their troop concentration across the border, Indian security planners were rightly worried about the possible threat to eastern India. This had led to a decision to withdraw troops from the Punjab border with Pakistan and mass them in Shiliguri focusing on the area of the Corridor. This was a difficult decision to make because intelligence agencies were suspicious of General Ayub Khan’s intentions. Yet, the then Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, had obtained the necessary clearance from the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to move troops from the Northwest to the East.40

One may take note that the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP), which contested the recent elections to the State Legislative Assembly in West Bengal, had failed to secure a significant mandate. Receiving an average of seven per cent of the total votes polled, the KPP has been humbled in vast tracts of North Bengal, which it wants to be a part of their ‘new State’ of Kamtapur. But now that they have failed to secure democratic sanction for themselves that could have validated their demand by providing numerical muscle, what will the party’s next agenda be? There exists a sense of collective denial about the existence of any insurgent action committed by anyone attached to the movement for a separate Kamtapur.41 Almost to a man, the KPP leadership has refused to acknowledge the existence of the KLO, even as the security agencies were equally insistent about its threatening presence. 

In the light of these developments, it is imperative to critically scrutinise the significance of the Shiliguri Corridor and to initiate steps to render it safe in the larger interest of maintaining the sovereign security and integrity of the region as also of the nation.

ENDNOTES

1. The meeting took place in Assam. Source: Intelligence reports. 

2. "Evaluation of the Chinese Threat", See www.indiavotes.com/columns1/2001feb2-tksludra.html 

3. The corridor comprises Islampur sub-division of Darjeeling district, Jalpaiguri Sadar and Alipurduar sub-divisions of Jalpaiguri district and Toofanganj, Mathabhanga, Coochbehar Sadar, Dinhata and Mekhliganj sub-divisions of Coochbehar district. 

4. Based on the report of the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K Subrahmanyam, the then Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee constituted a Group of Cabinet Ministers (GoM) in April 2000 to review the national security system and to formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GoM set up four task forces, one each for intelligence apparatus, border management, internal security and management of defence. Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, headed the task force on border management. He submitted a 499-page report to the GoM, headed by Union Home Minister L.K. Advani. 

5. See "Ministerial group gets report on border management", www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/20000830/ina30040.html; The Godbole report recommended that paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Assam Rifles should man international borders, but operate directly under the army in cases where the boundary line is unsettled or under dispute. 

6. The Telegraph, Kolkata, December 11, 2000

7. The Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in 1995 by the Koch-Rajbongshi tribes to carve out a separate Kamatapur State, comprising six north Bengal districts and Goalpara district in lower Assam through an armed struggle. For a profile of the KLO, see South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; www.satp.org 

8. "WB separatists woo Assam tribals" www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/01121999i.htm 

9. Ibid. The decision to prop up Rajbongshi rebel outfits was taken by the ULFA in December 1995 at the initiative of Raju Baruah, a senior leader of the ULFA's military wing. Subsequently, the ULFA entrusted the then chairman of its Darrang district unit, Ajit Kachari, with the task of setting up the Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) in Lower Assam. Simultaneously, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in North Bengal following a meeting at Kumargram. The first batch of 25 KRLO members went to the ULFA camps in Bhutan for training in December 1995.

10. "India: ULFA, KLO to launch joint movement in Assam". Both the outfits also decided to indulge in joint extortion drives in Assam. This decision was taken at a meeting in Bhutan in July 2001. www.satp.org/news/2001/August/news23.htm 

11. "India: North Bengal turning into hotbed of militancy", www.satp.org/news/November/news%2014.htm#8 

12. See South Asia Terrorism Portal ; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; www.satp.org 

13. "West Bengal seeks more forces" www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/09wb.htm 

14. "Kamtapur-Ne Nexus Uncovered", www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1010531/national.htm#head2 

15. "Ominous Kamtapur Nexus Unearthed", www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1001210/front_pa.htm#head2 

16. Ibid. Nichula base is adjacent to Kalikhola on the Indo-Bhutan border north of Uttar Haldibari. The camp, reportedly, is approximately 8 km north of Allay bust, the last Bhutanese border village, inside the Fifshu jungle. 

17. "Separatist movement in North Bengal gets Ulfa help", www.news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/12/10/n133.shtml 

18. "Bengal CM cautions against ultras", www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm 

19. Ibid. 

20. Two suspected militants were killed in an encounter with police at Tinkatari near Samshing, close to the Bhutan border on November 12, 2000. Those killed were reportedly cadres of the Gorkha Liberation Organisation. One security force personnel was killed and another injured during the encounter. See "Naga ultras killed in shootout", Statesman, Kolkata, November 13, 2000. 

21. On February 9, 2001, militants armed with sophisticated rifles and grenades attacked Ghising’s convoy bound for Darjeeling from Shiliguri on a narrow and winding mountain road. See "Thunder in the hills", Hindu, Chennai, February 18, 2001. Subba was arrested on March 23, 2001 near the Indo-Nepal border. 

22. "Stealthily, a rebel Gorkha group builds a base", http://news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/11/28/n52.shtml. 

23. "Bengal CM cautions against ultras", www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm 

24. "Ultra Getting Arms from Khmer Rouge", http://piglet.uccs.edu/~kalita/assam/news/1997/1997-11-25.html, See also "ISI training outfits in camps across Bangladesh", www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/16052000i.htm#i06 

25. See South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Assessment; www.satp.org 

26. Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 2001.

27. Indiainfo.com, October 26, 2000.

28. Pioneer, New Delhi, June 23, 1999. Also see "The Islamization of West Bengal", www.swordoftruth.com/swordoftruth/archives/byauthor/dhruvajyotibarua/ tiowb.html 

29. Times of India, February 15, 1999.

30. Intelligence sources. 

31. Telegraph, December 13, 2000.

32. "Kathmandu Revisited", People’s Review, Kathmandu, August 7, 1997.

33. T.V Rajeshwar, "The Lessons of Kosovo", Hindu, May 5, 1999.

34. Sreeradha Dutta, Security of India’s Northeast: External Linkages", Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, November 2000, Vol. XXIV No. 8, p. 1506.

35. Times of India, May 19, 2001. 

36. Times of India, April 16, 2001.

37. Hindu, September 8, 1999.

38. Dutta, "Security of India’s Northeast", p. 1506. 

39. Police in Kathmandu arrested a senior Pakistani diplomat Mohammad Arshad with 16 kg of RDX on April 12, 2001. According to official sources, the arrested diplomat, the first secretary in the Pakistani Embassy, was due to return to his country after a posting in Nepal. See www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailsmall_news.asp?date1=4/13/2001&id=7 

40. B.N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971, p. 382.

41. This was made evident during the writer’s visit to the region. 
 

India Under threat of Islamization

By Amitabh Tripathi on June 30, 2008 at http://vivekajyoti.blogspot.com/

Few days back along with one of my friend and national convener of new emerging political formation Yuwa Dal (Youth party)Vinay Kumar Singh I visited diamond harbour jail in west Bengal situated some more than hundred miles away from holy Hindu pilgrim place called Gangasagar. Occasion and motive of our visit was obvious as we have to meet leader of Hindu Samhati Tapan Ghosh who had been put behind bars under some non-bailable offence after a communally charged muslim mob attacked workshop of Hindu Smahati on 12th of June in Gangasagar. Our visit has journalistic motivation rather than any political. After this attack lot of versions came out in various articles in several websites but this incident had no coverage in so called mainstream media.After visiting West Bengal and meeting to workers of Hindu Samhati along with jail officials and local journalist it was quite clear why this incident did not has any coverage in mainstream media. First it was very normal incident which happened and in some way it was below normal because it had no causality and according to people of that state which is ruled by communists for more than decades and decades with its identity of political blood shedding rather than development or industrialization witness attack on political opponents of communists on regular basis and because of zero causality in the incident of 12 June in no way was a news for newspapers in West Bengal. So called national media or mainstream media refrained from giving coverage to this incident with fear of antagonizing establishment and government in centre, if they had to take cognizance of this incident they have to recognize the feud between Hindus and Muslims which aggravates the debate on communal status of the state so mainstream media adopted the middle path not to engage itself in the debate of relationship of Hindu and Muslims in West Bengal. But thanks to evolution of alternate media in the form of several websites and groups on various domains that ignite this debate and exchanged information between them.

When we visited West Bengal and met various organizations and people we were able to realize the gravity of the situation and meaning behind this incident. Motivation and provocation of this incident had been described in various articles and I am in no mood to repeat those things but some sensational facts which we gathered were certainly has some indications for future of relations of Hindus and Muslims in India.

Gangasagar is a holy pilgrimage for Hindus and around this place one Islamist mafia Ismail Sheikh has full control in this area and earns millions of millions rupees with controlling the water supply of this area and distributing the water to neighboring villages but in return this Islamist figure has no respect for Hindu sentiments as he instigate other Muslims to sell beef openly in pilgrimage area knowing well that Hindus have keeps high regard for cow and they find it sacred in their religion. In various pilgrimage areas in India selling beef is prohibited but in this particular place Muslims breach this norm only to tease Hindus as well showing their monopoly in those areas. Islamist figure Ismail Sheikh with help of a local communist leader SukhRam Panda when stimulated the attack on Hindus who were participating in a workshop it was first naked attack on Hindus with nexus of red and green or you say it nexus of communists and Islamists.

Story does not end here when we visited daimaond harbour jail we were shocked to some new facts for which we were not ready. A Hindu who was earlier in that particular jail for one month told us few things which were not less than shocking. In Daimond harbour jail there is a cell no.7 which has exclusively Muslim prisoners and that cell has been converted into Islamic cell as all the prisoners has circled some area of floor of that cell with blanket and call that area "Blanket Mosque". Nobody has any objection to any prisoner if he prays according to his faith in prison but all the kafirs has been prohibited to use bath room or toilet of that so-called Blanket Mosque area not only kafirs are being prohibited they are being forced to use their right hand to wash toilet or cleanse themselves which is barred according to Hindu religion as Hindus are being allowed only to use their left hand for toilet cleansing. These incidents were shocking only because they indicate something and which has some bigger meanings. Muslims in India are not ready to respect the sentiments of Hindus and peace is possible with them on only one condition that Hindus should become submissive and submit themselves to Islamic faith.

When we were on the visit of West Bengal Kashmir boiled on the issue of another Hindu pilgrimage issue. A holy and prestigious pilgrimage place situated in Kashmir and related to one of prominent Hindu deity "Shiva" called Amarnath another name of Shiva came under fire of Islamist forces. All this fuss started when regulatory body of Amarnath Pilgrimage Amarnath shrine board was allotted 40 hectare land in Kashmir to construct some temporary residential places in form of camps for pilgrims. In year 2000 government of J&K at that time headed by national conference formed Amarnath Shrine Board which is responsible to governor of state not government which later took over the responsibility of management of pilgrimage which now last for two months. When outgoing governor of J&K general S.K. Sinha allotted this forest land to shrine board some separatist groups and Islamist groups objected to this allotment as it would disturb echo atmosphere of valley. When CEO of shrine board Arun Kumar countered this argument with Hindu pollution vs Muslim pollution and made allegations that in Dull lake of valley Muslims are already habited and echo system is getting affected so how Hindus pilgrims could not be allowed to habitat in temporary camps during their pilgrimage. This statement came under fire and separatist and pro-Pakistani groups as Hurriyat conference and other political parties in Kashmir which have sympathy for Pakistan as per example PDP tried to vitiate the communal atmosphere of valley with provocative statements that government is trying to habitat Hindus in valley to disturb the demography of state. This statement exposes these groups and put big question mark on their crocodile tears for Kashmiri Hindus who have systematically annihilated from valley to pave the way for Islamisation of valley. From time to time these organizations claim that they are very much supportive of the idea that Kashmiri Hindus should return to valley as Kashmir has a different culture of Kashmiriyat but these sponsored protests against Hindu pilgrimage tells story in itself about their deception and motive.

India is Hindu majority state but Muslims have been given equal status here even in application of their sharia they are being given full freedom in the name of personal law and they don't follow land of law and challenge Supreme court of India not to dare interfere in their matters as divorce, marriage, polygamy, adaptation etc. Their waqf boards have full autonomy; these institutions are out of purview of land of law. Their pilgrimage of Haj has been awarded with state subsidy but these Muslims don't respect Hindu sentiments. In one of TV channel in discussion with this controversial leader of JKLF and former terrorist Yasseen Malik given byte that our objection is for management of this pilgrimage. According to this terrorist leader who was once name of terror in 1980's in valley for Hindus and main figure to compel Hindus to leave the valley told news channel that Amarnath shrine board had tradition for last sixty years to have management of this pilgrimage in hands of Muslims and get some amount of royalty from this pilgrimage which ultimately culminates in employment of hundreds and thousands of youths. At the same time if Yaseen Malik would have been asked if he has allowed Hindus to get management of Ajamer Shrif in Rajsthan, or management of WAQF board or Haj pilgrimage their answers is obvious big no. Then why management of Hindu pilgrims in Muslim hands only because they have mentality of Islamism and Islamic supremacy.

Our visit of West Bengal has experienced us that this state is under threat of Communists-Islamist take over with threat of Islamisation of India. This is not the story of West Bengal alone. Along with border areas of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal nexus of Maoists and Islamists building huge infrastructure to take over India with design of Islamism and Maoism. West Bengal is flooded with Bangladeshi Muslim infiltrators as earlier they were welcomed by communists as their potential vote bank and later on they are most vulnerable to Islamist recruitment. Border areas of India along with Bangladesh with border areas of states of Bihar, West Bengal and Assam has become potential threat for national security as demography of some districts has changed so miraculously with growth of more than 100 or 200%. On the one hand Bangladeshi infiltrators has been welcomed by political parties in West Bengal and Assam with garland in their hands and the other hand more than 10 million Hindus in these two states still struggling for their status as citizen of India. Hindus have only one state in the form of India which they claim as their homeland but in their own home they are being disowned because of their Hindu identity. Now if you visit India you would come to know Hindus are under seize, they are afraid, they are on the verge of another partition of their motherland in the name of religion. All this is happening due to Muslim appeasement and wrong interpretation of secularism which has become synonymous to Muslim appeasement.

Threat of Islamisation of India has some implications for world as well as India is the only democracy with pluralistic view between Tel Aviv to New Delhi. If this nation also comes under Islamic rule or disintegrate in another states on religious ground there would be no hope of democracy and free world in this world. Threat of Islamisation of India is not only threat of India it is a threat for civilized world as well. Need of the hour is to bring all civilized people and nation under one umbrella to fight against Islamisation of this world which has become gravest threat for civilized world in modern history after down fall of communism and fascism.

Illegal Migration and Undeclared Refugees – Idea of West Bengal at Stake

Presented at National Seminar on ‘Migration and Its Impact on Indian State and Democracy’ – 13 March 2009, Dept of Politics & Public Administration – University of Pune

 Illegal Migration and Undeclared Refugees – Idea of West Bengal at Stake

Mohit Ray

Mohit Ray, PhD (Engineering) is an independent environmental consultant and visiting faculty in School of Environmental Studies, Jadavpur University. He has been involved in human rights movement for last three decades and now leads a campaign for the rights of minorities in Bangladesh. He can be contacted at mohitray@hotmail.com

I

Idea of West Bengal: Eroded from the Very Emergence

West Bengal was created as a non-Muslim majority state in 1947. On 20 June 1947, Bengal Legislative Assembly got divided into East Bengal Legislative Assembly and West Bengal Legislative Assembly. In the West Bengal Legislative Assembly all the non-Muslim assembly members including the Communists favoured for the creation of this truncated state.1 One of the two Communist members was Shri Jyoti Basu. After the experience of ten years of Muslim-dominated coalition rule in Bengal between 1937 and 1947 and a series of riots for last three decades, particularly the Noakahli pogrom, the Hindu Bengal was not ready to go with Pakistan2. A well-known Left historian had to comment about the September riot in 1918 in Kolkata, which took place followed by a publication in Anglo-Indian newspaper the Indian Daily News, as

‘(that riot) anticipated many of the trends in future Muslim rioting in Calcutta – the mosque as an important rallying point, the upcountrymen as the main component of the violent crowd, the Marwari merchanr as favourite target of attack, and the vernacular press as the main forum for expressing communal animosities’.3, 4 .

The idea of West Bengal was to have a secular democratic entity quite different from what Pakistan was thought to be. Muslim-majority Pakistan and later Bangladesh became Islamic countries while West Bengal emerged as a part of the country with non-religious constitution.

No Exchange of Population

There was no exchange of population in Bengal as it happened for Punjab. Though Punjab passed through the initial months of mayhem, for following 60 years there has been no Hindu-Muslim problem or Sikh-Muslim problem in either parts of Punjab. East Punjab (Indian part of Punjab) had 33.09% of Muslims in 1941 which got reduced to 1.8% in 1951

and has not increased much.5 In fact it was B. R. Ambedkar who categorically stated long before partition in 1940 that

‘That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt’6.

The Muslim population which stood at 29.5% in 1941 in West Bengal got reduced to 19.5% in 1951, has shot back to 25.5% in 2001. We shall later deal with these figures in a greater detail and its significance for West Bengal. Going back to the advise of B.R. Ambedkar on this issue of numbers:

‘What do these figures indicate? ….. This distribution of the Muslim population, in terms of communal problem, means that while without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6 ½ crores of Muslims, with the creation of Pakistan it will involve only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for Hindus who want communal peace? To me it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, It substantially reduces its proportion…..’7

Nehru-Liaquat Treaty 1950 and Two Resignations

After the partition of India in 1947, within a year the situation started to settle down in Western border. It is generally expressed that Eastern part was relatively calm, and initial migration on both sides of Bengal were expected to stop in the coming years. But the situation in East Pakistan (and now in Bangladesh) always remained as a status of ‘gentle push’ even when there is no major pogrom. A simple method is to harass the Hindu neighbours, tease their women, violate the sanctity of their household by polluting their worshipping areas. Many a vivid accounts are available in Bengali writings.8

On 8^th April 1950 Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India and Liaquat Ali khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, signed an agreement between two countries to ‘ensure to the minorities throughout its territory complete equality..’ which included ‘freedom of movement’. Shyamaprasad Mukherjee, the minister of Industries and Supply in Nehru’s cabinet, resigned over this issue. In his statement in the Parliament on 14 April, 1950, he said

‘The fact thus remains that inspite of two Inter – Dominion Agreements as many as 16 to 20 lakhs of Hindus were sent away to India from East Bengal. About a million of uprooted Hindus had also to come away from Sind. During this period a large number of Muslims also came away from Pakistan mainly influenced by economic considerations. The economy of West Bengal received a rude shock and we continued as helpless spectators of a grim tragedy.

‘Hindus will continue to come away in large numbers and those who have come will not be prepared to go back. On the other hand, Muslim who had gone away will now return and in our determination to implement the agreement the Muslims will not leave India. Our economy will thus be shattered and possible conflict within our country will be greater.’

Like Ambedkar’s prophetic comment, Shyama Prasad’s comment is true for today. We shall discuss more about it later.

Within a few months another minister from Pakistan government also resigned. Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal, the minister of Law and Labour, of Liaqut Ali Khan’s cabinet sent

his resignation on 8 October 1950. Mr Jogendra Nath Mandal was the leader of Scheduled Castes in Bengal who was the flag bearer of Scheduled Caste –Muslim unity in Bengal.9 After partition he was rewarded with a Ministership in Pakistan cabinet. After riots in 1950, such a trustworthy person of Muslim League and a minister of the country had to run away from his promised heaven within three years to the ‘Brahminical’ Hindustan and send his resignation from there. Some excerpts from his resignation letter can be useful for this discussion and for the proponents of Dalit-Muslim unity of today. Mr. Mandal wrote:

‘Now this being the overall picture of Pakistan so far as the Hindus are concerned, I shall not be unjustified in stating that Hindus of Pakistan have to all intents and purposes been rendered “Stateless” in their own houses. They have no other fault than that they profess Hindu religion.’

Mr. Mandal foresaw the bleak future

‘After anxious and prolonged struggle I have to come to the conclusion that Pakistan is no place for Hindus to live in and that their future is darkened by the ominous shadow of conversion or liquidation. The bulk of the upper class Hindus and politically conscious Scheduled Castes have left East Bengal. The Hindus who will continue to stay in that accursed province for that matter in Pakistan will, I am afraid, by gradual stages and in a planned manner be either converted to Islam or completely exterminated.’

Two leaders of with so vast ideological differences shared this in common, a bleak future. But the mainstream political parties, Congress and Left and the refugees themselves ignored it to pave the way for today’s scenario.

Leftists Control of Refugee Movement and Stoicism of Upper Caste Refugees

The refugees in ‘50s were mostly from Caste Hindus. They were sure that they had no future in Pakistan and left for good. Even that meant staying in a thatched hut on a marshy land leaving the huge farm house in East Bengal. Their desperation for a good living in this new land made the refugee movement slowly more violent. The Communists used this anger to take control of this movement. A very detailed description of events have been documented by the historian Prafulla Chakraboty.10 The Left leadership could channelise the movement to their ‘anti-imperialistic’ goal, suppressing the atrocities of Islamic rule in East Pakistan. So the UCRC (United Central Refugee Council) processions started to raise slogans totally irrelevant to refugee problem, like the slogan against Imperialism in Korea or slogan for peace not war and against Anglo-American imperialism.11. Not only that, one UCRC convention in 1952 adopted a list of resolutions which included:

The Left-influenced refugee movement not only suppressed the continuous harassment of the Hindus in East Pakistan, they even went ahead in support of Pakistan. On 18 October 1952, UCRC meeting at Wellington Square condemned Shyama Prasad Mukherjee for demanding sanctions against Pakistan. 13 On 7 April 1953, UCRC had a big demonstration and presented a charter of demands to the West Bengal Legislative Assembly. Significantly it had one of the demands as ‘Rehabilitation of displaced Muslims and grant of interim relief to them’14, but no mention of refugees themselves for safely returning to East Pakistan in accordance with Nehru-Liaquat Pact. The betrayal of the upper caste refugees about their own people in East Pakistan ensured the future illegal migration and continuous flow of today’s refugees, who are mostly what is considered as Scheduled Castes by Indian Constitution. This caste difference sealed the fate of the Hindu refugees for later years, an expression of upper caste Hindu leadership in Left, right and centre and their indifference.

The one-way flow of Hindu refugees continued during the existence of East Pakistan till 1971. Except in 1964 when some riots took place in West Bengal as retaliation to major rioting against Hindus in East Pakistan15, West Bengal accepted the fate of Hindus in East Pakistan as normal. Throughout 60’s and 70’s, the political scenario in West Bengal was a race towards a communist revolution. The politically conscious people of different left stands were busy in engaging in violent actions against class enemies to bring revolution. The leftists slowly have conquered the total intellectual gamut of Bengali Hindus. The situations of the Hindus in East Pakistan never became any issue of discussion amongst left. Nobody mentioned that even after massive migration of the Hindu refugees in West Bengal, the proportion of Muslim population is on the rise.

Bangladesh War and the end of the legal Refugees

Awami League won the election in East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman declared independence on 26 March 1971. It was one of the quickest liberation struggles in history, thanks to Indian intervention. However Pakistan army carried out a genocide within nine months. Though many Bengali Muslims were killed, there was a plan to kill as many Hindus as can be done. Hamoodur Rahaman Commission, chaired by Hamoodur Rahaman, Chief Justic of Pakistan, revealed explosive documents which include written order to kill Hindus.16 R. J. Rummel , the researcher on killings by the state authorities, described a chilling gendercidal ritual, reminiscent of Nazi procedure towards Jewish Males:

"In what became province-wide acts of genocide, Hindus were sought out and killed on the spot. As a matter of course, soldiers would check males for the obligated circumcision among Moslems. If circumcised, they might live; if not, sure death."17

Bangladesh was liberated mostly on the dead bodies of Hindu Bengalis. Then there were nearly 10 million refugees, about 13% of then East Pakistan’s populations. There were 6797615 refugees in the government camps and 3101660 were on their own as per

government record. Out of the refugees in camps 92.7% were Hindus.18 It can be assumed that the refugees on their own will be mostly Hindus taking shelter in their relatives homes. This makes the total number of Hindu refugees as 9176627. Now Bangladesh census of 1974 shows the number of Hindus as 967300. This means nearly all the Hindu population of East Pakistan took refuge in India. This shows who were the real target of Pakistan Army and its Bengali Muslim collaborators.

However Bangladesh war only brought some nostalgic emotions about their lost East Bengal to upper caste Hindu refugees who were then mostly getting settled in West Bengal. This horrible aggression on their own brothers and sisters and their brutal killings evoked no angry response in West Bengal. The West Bengal was getting ready for new types of migration – Illegal migration and Undeclared refugees.

II

Indifferent Community, Invitation to Illegal Migration and Undeclared Refugees:

Barrier to critical research

Stunned eerie silence

The left influence on the Bengali Hindu mind was always strong. It has attracted Bengali youth from the days of the IPTA (Indian People’s Theatre Association). By 60’s the West Bengal intellectual world was totally overwhelmed by leftist ideas. The ’68 student rebellion in France, Vietnam War and Cold war between United States and Soviet Union, made the socialist liberation a dream for the youth in the world. Communist Party of India’s prominence (much due to refugee power), the revolutionary zeal of Naxalite movement and the support of the writers, academics, film directors, musicians to all these political movements – all practically turned West Bengal in a leftist state without the state power.

After so much upheaval in a society in such a small period, there is nearly no books, films or literature on this subject of forced migration of such a large number of people. There have been only stories and films made on the misery of refugee lives but never mentioning who made them refugees. Celebrated film maker Ritwik Ghatak’s films are its best examples. Its not the refugees have forgotten their past, rather they flaunt their link with East Bengal ceremoniously. There is a famous football club named ‘East Bengal’ which is religiously supported by the refugee youth and old. There are many societies named after different former districts of East Bengal e.g Chattagram Sammilani (Chittagong Association), Mymensingh Sammilani etc. They organise different programmes but never never they would touch upon any subject related with happenings in East Pakistan or today’s Bangladesh. You may go to any refugee organisation’s meeting, hear fiery lectures about the government’s apathy about the refugees’ demands but never any discussion about their past or the present situation of their own brothers and sisters in Bangladesh. Tathagata Roy sums it up nicely as:

‘In such circumstances one would expect the exodus of Hindus from East Bengal to be a hot issue in the state of West Bengal. One would expect hundreds of books to be written on the subject, articles appearing in the newspapers every now and then, research being conducted on the political, sociological and economic reasons for the exodus, as well as the fallout in these fields, debates on the question

No news from Bangladesh is good news

Trend is same today. Average Bengali has no idea about the situation in Bangladesh or about the undeclared refugees. So when Bangladesh changes its secular constitution adopted in 1972 after liberation war in 1977, (known as 5^th Amendment) to include “Absolute trust and faith in Allah as guiding principle of all state activities” in Fundamental Principles Clause 8 (1) and removes the whole Clause 12 on Secularism, it is no news in West Bengal. Then in 1988, Bangladesh constitution was amended (known as 8^th Amendment) to declare Islam as state religion. In 1990 after an attack on Babri Mosque (it was not demolished then, just hundreds of people climbed it), a countrywide rioting took place in Bangladesh. The Bengali Muslims not only damaged hundreds of temples throughout the country, looted Hindu shops and houses, also famous temples like Dhakeswari Temple in Dhaka, Kaibalyadaham in Chittahong were damaged and ransacked.20 The pogrom of larger scale took place in 1992 after Babri Mosque was destroyed. 28000 houses, 3600 religious places and 2500 commercial establishments were destroyed. 13 people were killed.21 None of these news ever reached the West Bengal people. The newspapers observe a self-censor about the Islamic violence. Even the killing of Humayun Azad or assault on Shahriar Kabir did not find any mention in the West Bengal media. A study by BRAC Researcher summed up the situation as ‘violence against minority was in the process being institutionalized in Bangladesh’. 22

Average Bengali newspaper reader and now TV viewers have no source to know about these incidents. After the election of BNP-Jamat coalition under Begum Zia in October 2001 a massive onslaught came down on the Hindu community. Several lakhs of people fled to India. Hundreds of women were raped days after days. The atrocities on the Hindus continued for next three years. Ekattarer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee (Committee for Resisting Killers and Collaborators of 1971) have published a three volume report on it edited by eminent human rights activists Shahriar Kabir.23 A case has been filed in The Supreme Court Of Bangladesh in 2006.24 These were never any news about such on going ghastly incidents in West Bengal though thousands entered West Bengal to take refuge. A 10000 strong procession by those refugees in Kolkata and demonstration in front of Bangladesh Deputy High Commission in Kolkata made no news in print or electronic media. No human rights organizations ever even gave a press statement on the issue.

Migration Research: Questionable ‘Objectivity’

In this mindset any research on the subject of Illegal Migration and Undeclared Refugees which no doubt would involve the Muslims and Bangladesh is a taboo in West Bengal. When even eminent historians like Amalendu De, an expert in Islamic History and ex-President of The Asiatic Society writes on infiltration, he finds no publisher and had to do with unknown little publisher.25 Similarly Prafulla Chakraborty, well known for his books on European History, could not find publisher for his seminal work ‘The Marginal Men’ and had to print himself. The most striking aspects of this source book published in 1990 that it has a very brief bibliography – simply because there is hardly any work on this issue. In last decade there has been some work on the issue of migration and refugees due to international funding on this subject. But still the researchers are very careful not to cross the sacred line what is known as ‘secularism’.

Chandan Nandy, the author of one of the few extensively researched treatises on the subject. States:

‘I had to approach the field research with extreme caution lest I ended up “taking sides”, especially because the pernicious debate between the left, centre and right of the Indian political spectrum invariably casts researchers as either “communal” or “secular”..’26.

It is difficult to survive in academic field and also get research funding if you are once branded as ‘communal’, especially in Left-run West Bengal. A detailed study of transborder migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal by Ranabir Samaddar provides human stories, theories, some useful data but very careful not to put any attention on the communal nature of Bangladesh. But such a massive reality could not be hidden so he provided a generous subsection ‘The vanishing Hindus of Bangladesh’ in which only Vested Property Act has been shown as the reason for such vanishing trick.27 Enough literature on the worst riots of 1990, and 1992, the rapes of hundreds of women of Bhola and others were easily available, but you cannot survive in the academic field if you mention those unmentionable which would drag the issue of Islamic violence. So Sammadar was much annoyed when a BSF hindi-speaking jawan reminded him to read ‘Lajja’,28 to understand the illegal migration. Samaddar was not happy that BSF jawan besides guarding the border should also know about Lajja and its impact.29. Of course for Samaddar, these riots or vanishing Hindus is a normal historical process which he welcomes as he writes in the introduction of his book,

‘My argument here is that though the human flows are very much a part and product of globalization, they also indicate a return to history, to local history and a past narrative of community, in short, they signal continuity. 30

And

‘Here I argue that the nation as a configuration is being continuously redefined, not the least through forces such as population flow……

So Mr Samaddar is waiting to see formation of a new nation in West Bengal, we shall see later what the face of that new ‘neo nation’ would be.

On a similar line a paper from Indian Statistical Institute on ‘undocumented migration’ the researcher tries to avoid the religious issue in a peculiar manner. She writes that ‘It is to be borne in mind that Bangladesh is not a secular state. Religion does play a role in migration’ but then goes on to say about the political and economic causes only responsible for four phases of migration from Bangladesh.32. The paper mentioning religious issue in several parts of the article had identified the Five ‘Push Factors’ in Bangladesh to be Economic, Demographic, Social, Political and Law and Order.33 She covers up religion under the wrap of ‘law and order’. Reacting to this article another academic comments,

Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal has been a continuous process since 1947. The reasons are historical, political, social, cultural, economic, geographical and environmental.34

Note the list of factors for migration again, citing everything except religious or communal factors.

III

Needed: Differentially Defining Illegal Migration and Undeclared Refugees

Definitions

Let us first clarify the terms ‘Illegal migration’, ‘Undeclared Refugees’ and ‘Infiltrators’.

There have been many discussions on the issue of migration and its legality including the unfettered right of migration of people. Any such theoretical debate is avoided here. It is simply that whoever enters a country without proper legal papers or reside without legal permission after entering legally is an ‘illegal migrant’. There should be no ambiguity in that. How that illegal migrant has to be treated is a different issue altogether.

A Refuggee is defined in Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol as:

"A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.."

However India, Pakistan, Bangladesh are not signatories to this convention or protocol. So by international law there have never been any refugees in between these countries. The 2005 UN data shows that in India there are 77200 refugees from China, 50730 from Sri Lanka, 9700 from Afghanistan, 1471 from Myanmar and 104 from Somalia. So UN keeps no data on the refugees of the subcontinent. Recently on 19 June 2007, a minority rights group Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities has filed a writ petition at Calcutta High Court on June 19th, 2007 appealing that Government of India should grant so the term refugee is considered here following the definition UN convention though India or Bangladesh is not a signatory. By that definition the Hindus from Bangladesh are entitled to be considered as ‘Refugee’. Till 25 March 1971, the Hindus who crossed over to India from East Pakistan were issued a receipt of their entry into the country. This receipt or slip was the proof of their ‘refugee’ status and they were subsequently granted citizenship of the country. These people are considered as legal refugees. Even Government of India’s notes also refer them as ‘refugees’.

On 29 November 1971, Government of India through its Under Secretary C.L.Goyal issued an Express letter No. 26011/16/71-10 to the Chief Secretaries to all State Governments and Union Territories Administrations. Its Subject: Grant of Indian Citizenship to refugees from East Bengal who have crossed over to India after 25^th March 1971. Instruction that application from such refugees for Indian Citizenship should not be entertained.36

According to the Sec 5.1(a) of Citizenship Act 1955, persons of Indian origin who are ordinarily resident in India and have been resident for five years immediately before making an application for registration; 37. The refugees from East Pakistan naturally became Indian citizens afterwards.

The situation changed from 26^th March, 1971, the category of ‘Undeclared Refugees’ came into being.

So the ‘illegal migrants’ other than ‘the undeclared refugees’ can be termed as ‘infiltrators’. By this definition infiltrator is a Bangladeshi Muslim as others like Hindus, Christians, Buddhists or Ahmedias can claim the status of a refugee due to religious persecution.

Citizenship Act 2003 and Undeclared Refugees

Though the provision of obtaining citizenship for these undeclared refugees were stopped by a notice, it was thought to be a temporary affair as there was still no legal bar from obtaining the citizenship. The act has been amended seven times. Till 1986 anyone born in India had the right to be an Indian citizen. Sons and daughters of the ‘undeclared refugees’ could therefore be Indian citizen. After 1986, only son or daughter of an Indian citizen can be a citizen. So the refugees who entered after 1986, not only they but their future sons and daughters are to be all illegal migrants.

The scenario changed further after the passing of Citizenship Act 2003 by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led NDA Government. The act aimed to please NRI Indians by providing them a chance of dual citizenship, but in the process, this party preaching Hinduttwa caused a major harm to the Hindu Refugees from Bangladesh coming after 25 March 1971. It further restricted the chance of getting citizenship for this undeclared refugee by stating that if the father or mother is an illegal migrant, their son or daughter is also illegal migrant. So several millions of undeclared refugees from Bangladesh have lost all hopes of citizenship

What was the reaction for such a devastating act and that too done by ‘communal’ NDA? At the intervention of the state of Gujarat and Rajasthan, citizenship have been given to the

Several thousands Hindus displaced from Sindh residing in those states following the guidelines of section 18 of the Act and subsequent rules of 2004.

But West Bengal remained silent. The Act which has been passed for 5 years but till now no worthwhile discussion on this life and death issue of millions of undeclared refugees have appeared neither in print media or electronic media. Hundreds of Bengali ‘little magazines’, considered to be heart of Bengali intellectualism, which brings out special issues on ‘Palestine’ to ‘HIV Aids’, never touched such an important issue.

IV

The Numbers: Demographic Disaster in West Bengal and Ethnic Cleansing in Bangladesh.

Demographical Disaster

Let us start with some of the most easily available statistics of change of Hindu and Muslim population in Bangladesh and West Bengal. Tables of growth of Hindu and Muslim population in Bangladesh and West Bengal are provided in details below:

Table 1

Hindu and Muslim Population Growth in West Bengal & Bangladesh, 1951-2001

		1951	1961		1974
Religions		Total Population (%)	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1951-61	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1961-74
Bangladesh	All Religions	41933	50840	21.24	71478	40.59
	Hindus	9239 (22.0)	9380 (18.5)	1.53	9673 (13.5)	3.12
	Muslims	32227 (76.9)	40890 (80.4)	26.88	61039 (85.4)	49.28

		1981		1991		2001
Religions		Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1974-81	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1981-91	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1991-01	Growth Rate (%) 1951-2001
Bangladesh	All Religions	87120	21.88	106315	22.03	123851	16.49	195.35
	Hindus	10570 (12.1)	9.27	11179 (10.5)	5.76	11379 (9.2)	1.79	23.16
	Muslims	74587 (86.7)	22.2	93881 (88.3)	25.87	111079 (89.7)	18.32	244.68

		1951	1961		1971
	Religions	Total Population (%)	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1951-61	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1961-71
West Bengal	All Religions	24810308	34926279	32.8	44312011	26.87
	Hindus	19462706 (78.45)	27523358 (78.80)	41.42	34611864 (78.11)	25.75
	Muslims	4925496 (19.85)	6985287 (20.00)	41.82	9064338 (20.46)	29.76

		1981		1991		2001
	Religions	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1971-81	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1981-91	Total Population (%)	Growth Rate (%) 1991-01	Growth Rate (%) 1951-
West Bengal	All Religions	54580647	23.17	68077965	24.73	80176197	17.84	223.16
	Hindus	42007159 (76.96)	21.37	50866624 (74.72)	21.09	58104835 (72.47)	14.23	198.54
	Muslims	11743259 (21.51)	29.55	16075836 (23.61)	36.89	20240543 (25.25)	25.91	310.13

Table 2

Districtwise Demographic Change In West Bengal 1951-2001

Population Ratio in Percent (%)

Region		1951	2001	% Change
West Bengal	Hindu	78.45	72.47	-5.98
	Muslim	19.85	25.25	5.4
Darjiling	Hindu	81.71	76.92	-4.79
	Muslim	1.14	5.31	4.17
Jalpaiguri	Hindu	84.18	83.3	-0.88
	Muslim	9.74	10.85	1.11
Kochbihar	Hindu	70.9	75.5	4.6
	Muslim	28.94	24.24	-4.7
Uttar & Dakshin Dinajpur	Hindu	69.3	60.22	-9.08
	Muslim	29.94	38.47	8.53
Maldah	Hindu	62.92	49.28	-13.64
	Muslim	36.97	49.72	12.75
Murshidabad	Hindu	44.6	35.92	-8.68
	Muslim	55.24	63.67	8.43
Birbhum	Hindu	72.6	64.69	-7.91
	Muslim	26.86	35.08	8.22
Bardhaman	Hindu	83.73	78.89	-4.84
	Muslim	15.6	19.78	4.18
Nadia	Hindu	77.03	73.75	-3.28
	Muslim	22.36	25.41	3.05
North 24 Pgs*	Hindu	77.26 (1971)	75.23	-2.03
	Muslim	22.43 (1971)	24.22	1.79
South 24 Pgs*	Hindu	72.96 (1971)	65.86	-7.1
	Muslim	26.05 (1971)	33.24	7.19
Hugli	Hindu	86.52	83.63	-2.89
	Muslim	13.27	15.14	1.87
Bankura	Hindu	91.16	84.35	-6.81
	Muslim	4.4	7.51	3.11
Puruliya*	Hindu	93.13 (1961)	83.42	-9.71
	Muslim	5.99 (1961)	7.12	1.13
Medinipur	Hindu	91.78	85.58	-6.2
	Muslim	7.17	11.33	4.16
Haora	Hindu	83.45	74.98	-8.47
	Muslim	16.22	24.44	8.22
Kolkata	Hindu	83.41	77.68	-5.73
	Muslim	12	20.27	8.27

Source: Census of India, 2001

# Maldah , a Hindu majority district has been turned into Muslim majority

# South Dinajpur district is on the verge of turning into Muslim majority

# Border districts of Maldah, Murshidabad, Uttar & Dakhsin Dinajpur, South 24 Parganas and Kolkata & Howrah have high increase.

Let us look the data carefully. Remember what Shyamaprasad Mukherjee told in 1950 while resigining from Nehru’s cabinet. The unusual growth of Muslim population during 1951-61 bears out his warnings. While Hindu population growth is very high of 41.42% due to huge influx of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan38, Muslim population growth was higher at 41.82%. No natural growth can explain this except massive coming back of Muslims back to West Bengal. Remember the role of UCRC, demanding rehabilitation of the Muslims and criticizing Shyamaprasad. Though the Hindu refugee influx continued39, the Muslim growth rate still surpassed that. It is a puzzle nobody bothered to look into. The worst demographic disaster happened during the height of rule of Jyoti Basu, the CPIM’s and country’s longest serving chief minister. West Bengal’s population growth rate was higher than the Indian national average till 1971 due to high influx of refugees. During 1971-81, for the first time West Bengal population growth rate went below the national average. During 1981-1991 again West Bengal population growth rate became above national average. During that period Hindu growth rate decreased from previous decade (you must keep in mind that influx of Hindu refugees never stopped), the Muslim growth was a phenomenal 36.89%. If there were any normal atmosphere of research and study in West Bengal, this abnormal population scenario should have been a major issue of debate, academic study, election issue, planning, environment etc. However it was silence as ever. Only a respected historian like Professor Amalendu De, once a member of Communist Party who married into the family of Fazlul Haq, the legendary leader Bengali Muslim peasantry, braved to write a small book on infiltration which was criticized in CPI(M)’s daily.40

In 1991-2001 the growth rate reduced but still had a large gap with the growth rate of Hindu population. So from 19.85% in 1951, Muslim population in West Bengal shot up to 25.85% in 2001. Remember Ambedkar’s visionary comment on numbers, this became the reality after 50 years of creation of the state of West Bengal.

Compare the overall growth rate in 50 years in two parts. In West Bengal, Hindu population growth rate was 198.54%, Muslim growth rate was one and half times higher at 310.13%! In Bangladesh, Hindu population growth rate was 23.16%, while Muslim population growth rate was more than ten times, at 244.68%. A comparative study of the population and the growth details of these two countries can be found in Bimal Praminik’s well-researched book.41

Worst Ethnic Cleansing in Peace Times

One can have a comparative look at the situation in Bangladesh. It can only be called ‘the worst ethnic cleansing in recent history’. We have mentioned before the ‘gentle push’ and ‘violent riots’ as the reasons for Hindu exodus. The other major reason was the ‘Enemy Property Act, 1965’ which was in fact an evolution of different earlier acts to grab the Presented at National Seminar on ‘Migration and Its Impact on Indian State and Democracy’ – 13 March 2009, Dept of Politics & Public Administration – University of Pune Illegal Migration and Undeclared Refugees – Idea of West Bengal at Stake – Mohit Ray 13

properties of the Hindus.42 The Enemy Property Act of Pakistan was renamed as Vested Property Act after the emergence of Bangladesh. Abul Barkat, Professor of Economics in Dhaka University, has done seminal work on this subject. Even after the Pakistan regime is gone, Vested Property Act is still used to grab Hindu properties, an interesting example is given by Prof Barkat in the preface of his book:

The tales of prominent persons who have been affected by the VPA are well known. For example, Mr. Dhirendra Nath Dutta, the veteran politician from Comilla, freedom fighter against the British Raj, and a member of the then-Pakistan Constituent Assembly, raised the first voice of protest in the Parliament against imposition of Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan and demanded Bangla be recognized as a State Language. After dedicating his whole life to the people and fighting to his last breath for the cause of the country, Shaheed Dhirendra Nath Dutta was brutally tortured and killed along with his son Dilip Dutta by Pakistani Armies in 1971 in Comilla Cantonment. The tiny, token village property left to his family after he had donated the rest of his landed property for welfare and educational purposes in his village Ramrail in Brahmanbaria District was grabbed by a group of people under the pretext of ‘vested property.’ In response to the case filed by his family members in the Subjudge Court of Brahmanbaria, the Court demanded that the family produce Shaheed Dhirendra Nath Dutta’s death certificate, an impossibility in the case of a liberation was martyr, Other eminent personalities such as Masterda Surjya Sen, who dedicated his life to the freedom struggle against the British Raj, Mr. Amal Sen, a veteran leader of peasant movement in British India who because of his involvement in the political struggle for freedom and democracy spent about twenty years in Pakistani prison, and Mr. Barin Mazumder, the renowned classical artist who devoted his life to developing the music and culture of this country, had their properties listed as enemy properties by the Pakistani administration.43

In his later work, he estimated about 6.3 million missing Hindu population during 1971-1991. These are our undeclared refugees. If two third of these people settle in West Bengal, the number of undeclared refugees will be 4.2 million. Let us see in details about Prof Barkat’s estimation:

‘According to the 2001 Bangladesh Population Census, the total size of the Hindu population in Bangladesh was 11.4 million. Assuming the 1961 population share of the Hindu population (18.4%), the absolute size of the Hindu population in 2001 would have been 22.8 million instead of 11.4 million as reported in the census, i.e., the actual current (2001) size is half (50%) of the expected size, Mass out-migration of Hindu population (mostly of India) during mid-1960s and onward is a reality beyond doubt. Among the various factors responsible for such out-migrations of the Hindu population, the effects of the Enemy / Vested Property Act were important ones. The exact effect of all these factors (e.g., communal riots, Indo-Pak War of 1965, Enemy and Vested Property Acts) is difficult to quantify due to lack of relevant reliable information. Thus, an attempt has been made to estimate the mission Hindu population during 1964-1971, 1971-1981, 1981-1991, and 1991-2001 using appropriate assumptions.

According to the information in the Population Census, the average annual growth rates of the Muslim Population was 3.13 percent for 1961-1974, 3.08 percent for 1974-1981, 2.20 percent for 1981-1991, and 1.7 percent for 1991-2001 periods.

Assuming a 13 percent lower fertility rates for the Hindus compared to the Muslims, the average annual growth rates of Hindu population in “no out-migration” situation would have been 2.72 percent during 1964-1971, 2.68 percent during 1971-1981, 1.92 percent during 1981-1991, and 1.48 percent during 1991-2001.

By extrapolating the above rates, the Hindu population in 1971 would have been 11.4 million instead of 9.6 million as reported in the official documents. The Hindu population would have been 14.3 million in 1981 instead of 10.6 million, 16.5 million in 1991 instead of 11.2 million, and 19.5 million in 2001 instead of 11.4 million. Therefore, there were some 1.8 million mission Hindu population during 1964-1971, 1.9 million missing Hindu population during 1971-1981, 1.6 million missing Hindu population during 1981-1991, and 2.8 million missing Hindu population during 1991-2001. Thus the estimated total missing Hindu population was 8.1 million during 1964-2001, i.e., 218,919 Hindus missing each year. In other words, if out-migration of the Hindu population is caused mainly by communal disharmony resulting from the Enemy / Vested Property Acts, the approximate size of the missing Hindu population would be 600 persons per day during 1964-2001. The approximate size of the missing Hindu population was as high as 705 persons per day during 1964-1971, as against 521 persons per day during 1971-1981, decreasing to 438 persons per day during 1981-1991, and rising to 767 persons per day during 1991-2001.44

Interestingly, though these missing populations have come to West Bengal, the Economics Departments of various Universities in West Bengal never cared to carry out research corresponding to what Prof Barkat has done. The reason is well known.

Now we proceed to the numbers from the Indian side.

Infiltrators - how many

What is the number of infiltrators? Government sources do not segregate between the illegal migrants and the undeclared refugees, only sometimes some figures are given. Let us go by some initial government statistics and the reactions by the Congress and the Left parties.

Home Minister Shri Indrajit Gupta in reply to a question in Parliament on 6^th May, 1990 stated that the number of illegal immigrants in India was about one crore. So by 1990, a figure of 10 million comes into discussion. Now see the reaction of Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi, an important Congress leader from West Bengal:

Mr. Chairman, Sir, I heard in the last two occasions this particular debate on this resolution. Before I participate in the discussion on the resolution, I had the privilege to hear the distinguished Home Minister Shri Indrajit Gupta the other day while replying to a question. I do not know the reason and the logistics which provided him the strength to admit in the House that about ten million foreigners are now residing in India. Having said so on the floor of the House that ten million foreigners are in the country at the moment and also admitting the fact that the people who are to prevent their entry from across the border, are not performing their jobs very efficiently, it really gave a handle to those who have been creating a lot of hue and cry on this issue and to a great extent had communalised this campaign as Shri Banatwalla said just now.

So mentioning the number of ten million of infiltrators irritated Mr Dasmunsi very much. What more to please the infiltrators waiting to enter. Mr Dasmunshi continues:

Sir, it is a fact that historically when India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were together during the days of freedom struggle, when we were all one against the British empire, our cultural, social, and political aspirations and our emotional ties were one. …… Be it a Muslim in Bangladesh, be it a Muslim in Pakistan, their dreams for this sub-continent in the days of the struggle against the British and their cultural, religious, emotional passion, are the same today also. …. Let us take stock of our border States and Provinces. Jammu, Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat border with Pakistan. Whether you like it or not, if anything goes wrong in these four States, a habit has developed in this country just to doubt and cast aspersions on the Muslims of this area, as the agents of Pakistan. ….. If there is a war again, the spies of the Government will start finding out whether the agents might not be anybody other than the Muslims. Let us try to understand in what manner we are cheating them day in and day out.

Do you need a Jamat or Muslim league anymore in India while Dasmunshis are there? Mr Dasmunshi goes on even encouraging violating the Indian Citizenship Act standing in Indian Parliament:

Thirty years ago, a daily wage earner of the agricultural field, may be his name is, Shri Ramatulla Khan, could not thrive in his own part and maybe on the side of Tripura or West Bengal or Assam, the big landlords whether Hindu or Muslim, asked Shri Ramatulla Khan during agriculture season to come and work in the field and to give support to agricultural production. Shri Ramatulla Khan went and stayed there for long with his family and children. Now when the time has come to identify, we do not go to the background as to how Shri Ramatulla Khan came in. We go straight to the child and tell like this: "Look here, your father came here as an illegal immigrant. We have enough documents because Rahmatullah used to stay in a village till 16th August 1947 or till such and such a date of August 1950 or August, 1960. You are his child and get out from here." This is the kind of an attitude we have always adopted throughout the country.

A Memebr of Parliament standing inside Parliament telling the administration not to disturb the infiltrator family! And then Mr Dasmunsi introduces his background. –

I was born in Bangladesh….. One night I came out and found that there was a trouble. My father, mother and sister were staying in the House and the house with all the property was lit. The next day morning, I found that the gentleman and his brother, who escorted us safely to cross the border, were Muslims. After having successfully crossed the border, myself, my mother and my sister arrived by train at the border of India. After seven days, we gathered the news that the great Muslim family which helped us had been killed at the hands of some fanatics. I still remember it….. When I became a Minister, I went to visit their family. What a contribution they have made for promoting brotherhood!

A fantastic account from a refugee boy! The so much celebration of Hindu-Muslim brotherhood. But then why the Dasmunshi family came from East Pakistan and stayed back in India. In some incident, his family house might be burnt, they also could take shelter in another place for a few days but why they did not go back to his ancestral home again!!

The issue of infiltrators also dogged the days of Shri Jyoti Basu, whose government was responsible for this invasion to begin. In an article published in CPI-M’s Bengali daily Ganashakti on 11 October 1992, on the Infiltration problem Jyoti Basu wrote:

..From 1979 the Muslims are also coming to India. Between 1977 to 1992, BSF has identified and pushed back 2,35,529 Bangladeshi infiltrators. Amongst them 68472 were Hindus and 1,64,132 were Muslims. At the same time between 1977 to 1992, Mobile task Force has pushed back 2,16, 985 Bangladeshi infiltrators. Amongst them 56342 were Hindus and 1,69,795 are Muslims.45

So we find during 15 years about 4.5 lakhs of infiltrators were pushed back and 73% of them were Muslims. If we consider that only 30% of the infiltrators are caught, then this itself is enough to quantify the problem of Muslim infiltration in West Bengal.

On July 14, 2004, in reply to a question in the Parliament, the Congress Minister of State for Home Affairs Sri Prakash Jaiswal informed that there 1 crore 20 lakhs 53 thousand and 950 illegal Bangladeshi in the country. Out of that West Bengal has 57 Lakhs of the illegal Bangladeshi. The list is given below. As usual when the pro-islamic ‘secular’ media raised a hue and cry, the minister had to say that ‘the reported figures were not based on any comprehensive or sample study but were based on hearsay and that too from interested parties. Therefore, no realistic figures can be given for illegal Bangladeshi migrants in Assam. In the case of West Bengal also the figures are based on unreliable estimates and are incorrect’46 The figure also show that there are 3,75,000 Bangladeshis in Delhi and this may mean that there are more Bangladeshi Bengalees in National Capital than the Indian Bengalees. This also shows the incompetence of BJP governments who ruled both the Delhi State and the Central Government in recent times.

Table 3

Bangladeshi Migrants in India – 2004

State	Estimated Number
Arunachal Padesh	800
Assam	5000000
Bihar	47900
Gujarat	100
Haryana	550
Madya Pradesh	700
Maharashtra	20400
Meghalaya	30000
Nagaland	59500
Orissa	30850
Punjab	150
Rajasthan	2500
Tripura	325400
UP	26000
W Bengal	5700000
Andaman & Nikobar	3000
Delhi	375000
11622850

Chandan Nandy has done excellent work by tracking the infiltrators and their modous operandi, both in West Bengal and Assam, by direct field study and from secondary sources.47 He provides one nice example:

The fact that West Bengal has been and continues to be a favourite destination for Bangladeshi migrants is testified by the results of a pilot project that the Government of India launched in 2003 in the Murshidabad-Jiaganj belt of Muslim-majority Murshidabad district, believed to be home to hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi migrants, as part of its larger scheme to issue multi-purpose national identity cards to citizens. The work on the ground was to be executed by the district administration. The Murshidabad-Jiaganj belt was chosen along with a few other areas in some of the border states of India as a feasibility project whose objective was “quick identification and deportation of illegal migrants in the country as also a credible identification system for multifarious socioeconomic use…that would involve a massive exercise of compulsory registration of all citizens and non-citizens”. Although the final report is yet to be submitted to the government, the provisional findings of the Murshidabad-Jiaganj project came up with startling results: Of the 255,000 people covered under the project, only 9.4 per cent or 24,000, could produce “at least one supporting document” of their Indian nationality; 90.6 per cent or 231,000 could not produce even one of the 19 prescribed documents. The newspaper that broke the story had this to say: At first glance, the revelation seems to confirm what critics of the Left Front government have been alleging – that the state machinery has papered over the existence of a huge mass of populace which does not belong to the country but has been allowed to stay on as captive vote bank.48 Those who could not produce any of the prescribed documents – land deeds, ration card, drivers’ licence, voters’ identity card to name a few – have been put under the category of “citizenship in suspense”. One junior bureaucrat said that over the years, Lalgola

The reaction of the CPI-M was, not surprisingly, similar: “It is a sensitive issue and not possible for the state alone to combat it…But your figures are absurd.”49…. Neither the West Bengal government nor the CPI-M agrees that the estimated number of Bangladeshi illegal immigrants in the state is ‘no fewer than 10 million’.

So the unprecedented scale of the infiltration and undeclared refugee influx is a case in point, though it never received an iota of legitimate attention.

V

Impact: Secular Democratic Society At Stake

Though we do not know the exact figure of either the infiltration or undeclared refugee influx but the scale is clearly perceptible. Abul Barkat’s estimates provide 4.5 million undeclared refugees. Some of them have come with regular visas but mostly without any documents. We find from previous discussions that the Muslim infiltrators are nearly three times the Hindu refugees trying to sneak in to India. Taking that figure, the number of infiltrators will be around 12 to 14 million. We have an illegal population of say 15-18 millions of which many are not recorded in any registrar. So West Bengal’s real population may be between 80 to 90 million, not 80 million recorded in Census 2001. But as the numbers are not specific, the impact can be predicted only qualitatively.

The impact of an unrecorded population of such a magnitude cannot be ignored at social, economic, political or environmental level. Let us first take the issue of any planning for the state which include Food, Shelter, Sanitation, Education – the basic needs. West Bengal is already one of the most underperforming states. NSS 61st Round, July 2004-June 2005 showed that the percentage of rural household not getting enough food every day in some months of the year was the highest in West Bengal (10.6 per cent). 50 So when you have a large number of unrecorded people it is diffcult to plan. From environmental point of view, West Bengal already is the most densely populated state in the country. It is impossible to take more people in it. We have already seen that land is such a scarce resource in West Bengal, it has become the focal point of all development issues. Already the issue of land in Singur and Nandigram villages have caused a political turmoil in the state which has further economic impact in terms future investment of industrial capital in West Bengal. So if these influx of infiltrators and undeclared refugees continues unabetted, the problem will intensify in the coming days.

The alarming increse of population put excess pressure on the natural resources. More the people are poor, more they depend on direct natural resources for livelihood. It can be water from the ponds, wood from the jungle or other house building materials. All these have direct impact on environment and public health. The undeclared refugees living along the train tracks connecting Kolkata to the eastern border town of Bangaon are already creating a havoc on environment and public health. The infiltrators residing on the border villages or working in the towns also face similar problems due to poverty. A poor state like West Bengal is often helpless in the face of such influx.

Planning with a large dose of finacial help can mitigate the economic problems to some acceptable level, but the cultural, political and social environmental impacts are often irreversible.

Expansion of Madrasas and Assault on Secualr Education

After coming to power in 1978, Left-front government went full steam ahead to encourage madrasa education. Their yearly list of successes always include the success of spreading more madrasa education with ever-larger state funding. While students of various other religions study under different non-religious educational boards (West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, Central Board of Secondary Education, Indian School Certificate Examination etc), the Muslims have to study under a Islamic educational board, the rationale is never questioned. This is not a place of detailed discussion on it but these madrasas are the cradles of Islamic fundamentalism. This was publicly admitted by Shri Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, the Communist Chief Minister of West Bengal, while commenting on attacks on US Centre in Kolkata in January 2002. Of course later he had to eat his own words, saying he was misquoted.51

Again remember the number game mentioned by B R Ambedkar. As the number of Muslims without any progressive leadership increases, there is always an ever-expanding space for bargain for orthodoxy. Now all the political parties from CPI-M led Left Front Trinamul Congress or Congress – compete with each other promising more Madrasas. Few years back when the case contesting the ban on Taslima Nasrin’s book ‘Dwikhondita’ was being heard in Calcutta High Court, very young boys from different madrasas wearing Palestinian scarfs used to be brought in hundreds to shout insulting slogans against Taslima Nasrin, the rebel writer banished from Bangladesh.

Rise in Muslim Population and Electoral change of West Bengal

As discussed earlier, demographic danger is already a reality. Recent change of electoral constituencies in West Bengal show the impact. While the Hindu-dominated areas have lost the constituencies, seats have shot up in the Muslim-dominated areas. Kolkata, which earlier had 21 state legislative assembly seats now has only 11 seats. Again, Hindu-dominated Purulia and West Medinipur districts looses two constituencies each, one each in Bankura, Burdwan, Birbhum and Hooghly. Muslim-dominated areas e.g in Murshidabad, the number of seats increased by three and for both North Dinajpur and Nadia the increase was by two seats each. Malda, and South Dinajpur gained one each. Now see the demographic change at the 0-6 year level. The amazing 2001 census results show that while the Muslim population in state is 25.25%, their children (0-6 years) constitute 33.17%. Ambedkar’s prophecy came to be true.

Table 4

Religious Proportion of Children (0-6 years) in 2001

Region		Population %	Children %	% Discrepancy
West Bengal	Hindu	72.47	64.61	-7.86
	Muslim	25.25	33.17	7.92
Darjiling	Hindu	76.92	76.18	-0.74
	Muslim	5.31	8.26	2.95
Jalpaiguri	Hindu	83.3	80.44	-2.86
	Muslim	10.85	13.8	2.95
Kochbihar	Hindu	75.5	69.82	-5.68
	Muslim	24.24	30	5.76
Uttar & Dakshin Dinajpur	Hindu	60.22	51.67	-8.55
	Muslim	38.47	47	8.53
Maldah	Hindu	49.28	43	-6.28
	Muslim	49.72	56	6.28
Murshidabad	Hindu	35.92	29.35	-6.57
	Muslim	63.67	70.27	6.6
Birbhum	Hindu	64.69	58.42	-6.27
	Muslim	35.08	41.15	6.07
Bardhaman	Hindu	78.89	75	-3.89
	Muslim	19.78	23.62	3.84
Nadia	Hindu	73.75	66.71	-7.04
	Muslim	25.41	32.55	7.14
North 24 Pgs*	Hindu	75.23	65.52	-9.71
	Muslim	24.22	34	9.78
South 24 Pgs*	Hindu	65.86	55.41	-10.45
	Muslim	33.24	43.85	10.61
Hugli	Hindu	83.63	78.94	-4.69
	Muslim	15.14	19.53	4.39
Bankura	Hindu	84.35	81.8	-2.55
	Muslim	7.51	10	2.49
Puruliya*	Hindu	83.42	81.62	-1.8
	Muslim	7.12	9.26	2.14
Medinipur	Hindu	85.58	81.36	-4.22
	Muslim	11.33	15.36	4.03
Haora	Hindu	74.98	64.81	-10.17
	Muslim	24.44	34.68	10.24
Kolkata	Hindu	77.68	70.24	-7.44
	Muslim	20.27	27.81	7.54

A Colluding State, Shariat courts and Assault on Democracy

The rising numbers, violent methods and a colluding State has made the practice of democracy in state at stake. The share of Hindu population in border areas of West Bengal

are decreasing day by day. Bimal Pramanik has studied the issue of four border districts in details.52 His findings show the massive population growth, particualrly that of Muslim population in these districts. His extensive interviews also show that the Hindus are living in fear of life, property and dignity. There is a limeric commonly going around in these areas:

Garu Rakhbi Campe, Taka Rakhbi Banke, Bou Rakhbi Kotahy?

[You May Keep Your Cows In Camp (BSF camps), Your Money in Bank, But where can you hide your wife?]

Listen to the admission of a district official,

Village after village in Murshidabad, which were earlier Hindu dominated, are now Muslim dominated. Take Char Nirmal as an example. It has been completely taken over by Bangladeshis. Elsewhere in Bhagawangola block, Hindus have either sold off their property and left the villages for small towns and urban agglomerates or they have been pushed to the fringes of the villages. Barring the towns, where they have some presence, the Hindus are in a minority in practically all the villages of Murshidabad. The writ of the immigrants runs strong, especially in the border villages. The local administration is practically run by them. They are more vocal in their demands. On the other hand, the Hindus seem to have meekly given in. A section of them, though, is seething at the sudden assertiveness of the Muslim immigrants. 5

The Shariat court is now common in these areas. The Islamic fervour is so strong that such a court in end July 2008 ordered and executed the beheading of a Hindu man. The wife of the man was a local Muslim girl who went to work in Mumbai and met the boy there. They had a son. While the couple came to the girl’s village in Murshidabad, after knowing the religion of the person, the village court ordered to kill him.54 Muslim girl being lashed for unwed pregnancy (Murshidabad, April 2004) or Muslim bride being nailed into the knee for a claimed adulterous relationship in the absence of her husband, all are verdicts from the shariat courts (Murshidabad, October 2006). These are the tips of the iceberg, could filter through to the national dailies.

In fact the show of Muslim muscle power as mentioned in the beginning, is becoming a common sight. There was a clash between Hindu and Muslims on 8 January 2009 at Medinipur town, during Muharram procession. Medinipur is a Hindu dominated area. Fear of Muslim violence was so serious that three weeks later, holding of Saraswati Puja in the town, a big festival for Hindus, was kept in hold, and was permitted just few days before the puja.55 The experience of Chandan Nandy during his study can throw more light on the borderlands:

‘In my travel in the West Bengal and Assam borderlands, the “considerable” mushrooming of mosques and Islamic seminaries, funded by money funneled from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in West Asia, Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan and Bangladesh, was evident and backed up by government documentation which claim that these places of worship and learning have become hot-beds of fundamentalism and anti-India propaganda. When I met an 18 year-old maulana³⁵ at Fakirerbazar in Assam’s border district of Karimganj, who carried a book titled How Sweet and Beautiful it is to Embrace Death, it was evident how easy it is to label Muslims as fundamentalists ready to die in the cause of jihad. The easy availability of audio

cassette tapes of Bangladeshi Jamaat-e-Islami clerics like Delawar Hussein Saidi, preaching anti-Hindu and anti-India sermons, and taped eulogies of Osama bin Laden, only reinforce Hindu and official belief of growing Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh out to create a Brihot Bangladesh or a Greater Bangladesh carved out of the territory settled by its Muslim population. As one Indian writer explains: “Some of the Islamic militant groups of Bangladesh like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, Shahadat-al-Hikma, Jamait-ul-Mujahideen and the Islami Manch make no secret of their aim to establish a transnational Islamic state comprising Bangladesh, Muslim majority districts of West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and the Rohingya Hills of Myanmar.” ⁵⁶

Expulsion of Taslima Nasrin probably signals the beginning of the last days of a democratic secular West Bengal. The Communist government imposed a ban on ‘Dwikhondito’ by Taslima Nasrin, Calcutta High Court rejected the appeasement of Islamic fundamentalists by lifting the ban. While the Calcutta High Court could thwart the Left Front governments’ attempts to Muslim appeasement, the mighty force of fundamentalist violence took law and order in its hand to throw Taslima out of West Bengal. A day-long violence on 21 November 2007, virtually supported by all the major ‘secular’ parties and ‘secular’ intelligentsia showed the shape of society to come.

This ‘neo nation’ again flexed its muscle between 6-8 February 2009 at the heart of Kolkata. It went on rampage by attacking the office of the Statesman, one of the oldest newspapers in the subcontinent. The Statesman published an article by veteran journalist Johann Hari of The Independent, London, on 5th February, 2009, which criticized all religions. To protest, the Muslims started violence and continued for three days.57 No print or electronic media published any news about it. The Statesman editor was arrested and released later, but there were no sign of any human rights group or journalist’s organization to protest. Of course no political party had the courage to say anything and as usual State colluded with the arsonists.

This is probably the future of West Bengal. And those undeclared refugees, hounded out from home by a violent society and now hounded by a State, see it like this:

‘I had thought that my family and I had seen the last of Islamic fundamentalism in my village in Pirojpur in Bangladesh. But I can’t say the same now that I am here. When we moved here, we had felt we had come to a secure place. Now I find the same Muslims, who raped our daughters and sisters, grabbed our land and homesteads, stole our cattle and agriculture produce, and persecuted us as my neighbour. We find the mosques blaring the same prayers that we had hated. We are told these mosques have now become the centres of fundamentalist activity in India. We are being overwhelmed again, by greater numbers of Muslims. Where will this all lead to? A time will come when we will no longer be as meek and timid as we were in Bangladesh.’58

The author, on his campaign experience for last seven years, have heard similar views from so many undeclared refugees.